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All three of the main political parties in
Britain are now putting the idea of
fairness at the heart of their policy
agenda. The Conservatives propose ‘a
blueprint for fairness’; the Liberal
Democrats want ‘to restore fairness to
British families’; and the prime minister
aspires to create ‘a fair Britain for the
new age’.
What these words mean concretely
remains unclear, but there appears to
be a common concern with equality –
of outcome and/or opportunity – an
area in which research by the Centre
for Economic Performance (CEP) has
made many pioneering contributions.
Over the past two decades, work by
researchers at the Centre has
documented rising labour market
inequalities in Britain – and uncovered
their causes in large-scale technological
and institutional change. And a series
of CEP studies has revealed that social
mobility has fallen between the cohort
of British children who grew up in the
1960s and early 1970s and those who
grew up in the 1970s and 1980s – a
social science ‘fact’ that is now
embedded in public debate.
In this CentrePiece, CEP’s research
director Stephen Machin, who was
recently appointed to the government’s
new National Equality Panel, describes
the ‘big ideas’ that have emerged from
the Centre’s longstanding programme
on wage inequality. Future issues will
review CEP research on and evaluation
of key policy responses such as
education and the minimum wage.
In a separate article with Jo
Blanden, Machin outlines the latest
evidence on what has happened to the
life chances of children born into poor
families since 1970. This shows that
contrary to the oft-repeated claims of
many politicians and commentators,
the downward trend has not continued
but appears to have flattened out.
Two further articles touch on the
theme of inequality: one on how
inflation hurts the poor more than the
rich; the other charting British people’s
diminishing enthusiasm for
redistribution.
We also feature two more stories
that illustrate the complex interactions
between politics and economics. As the
US presidential race nears the finish,
one article shows that industries in the
so-called ‘swing states’ are more likely
to enjoy trade protection.
And our cover story examines the
impact of planning regulations
designed to restrict the development of
‘big-box’ supermarkets. This is an issue
on which politicians clearly do take
different positions – and it turns out
that those most strongly opposed to
big boxes have set in motion the
opposite effect from what they
intended, actually accelerating the
decline of smaller independent stores
on the British High Street.
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one intended.
The new planning regulations –
introduced in 1996 and reinforced in
1999 – stipulated that retailers wanting to
open a store of more than 2,500 square
metres had to pass a ‘sequential test’ and
a 'test of need'. These tests demanded
proof that large out-of-town
developments could not be created in
alternative in-town or edge-of-town
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G
iven that we claim to
be so attached to the
traditional British
High Street, it seems
odd that until the
mid-1990s, fewer
and fewer of us spent much of our time
shopping there. Instead we were
migrating to the out-of-town behemoths:
gigantic mega-stores run by, among
others, Tesco, Sainsbury’s and Asda (now
owned by Wal-Mart, the world leader in
such superstores).
But over the course of the 1990s – in
part as a result of pressure from groups
concerned about the plight of small
independent retailers – the planning
regulations changed, with the effect that
large retail chains significantly slowed the
expansion of ‘big boxes’. My research
shows that this actually may have harmed
small independent retailers in the British
Does planning regulation 
protect independent retailers?
In 1996, new regulations made it much harder for
UK supermarkets and other retailers to develop
new out-of-town outlets – so-called ‘big boxes’.
In part, these regulations were supposed to ‘save
the traditional British High Street’ by protecting
small retailers. Research by Raffaella Sadun
shows that they might have actually accelerated
the decline of independent stores.
locations, and that these new retail
developments were ‘needed’ in the area.
The reforms also increased the role of
local authorities in the implementation
and interpretation of these planning
guidelines. Significantly, this meant that
local politicians could select which large
stores could open in their area.
Under the new planning system, the
number of successful planning
applications in an area depended both on
local demand conditions (whether firms
would want to open a new store there)
and on local politics (whether politicians
would let them). Overall, these changes
added significant monetary and time costs
to the application process. Unsurprisingly,
the development of new big boxes
declined sharply, as Figure 1 shows.
But the fall in the opening of big
boxes did not coincide with a reduction in
the total number of new stores, rather
with a change in their size and location.
In the years following the introduction of
the reforms, the major UK retail chains
started to open more small stores on high
streets and in city centres. Griffith and
Harmgart (2005) show that since the late
1990s, the top four UK retail chains
substantially increased the number of
small convenience stores opened in town
centres relative to investments in large
stores in out-of-town locations.
Figure 2 shows how the median size
of stores operated by the big supermarket
chains fell between 1997/8 and 2002/3.
Over the relatively short period of four
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Figure 1:
Planning grants for large retail stores declined sharply
after regulations introduced in 1996
Note: The figure reports the number of
major retail applications granted across 
304 English local authorities between 1993
and 2003.
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Figure 2:
After 1996, supermarket chains began opening smaller stores
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Note: The figures show the changing average size of ‘non-specialised stores’ (mostly
supermarkets) operating nationally (that is, in all 11 UK regions) in 1997/8 and 2002/3, as
measured by employment in each store. The vertical lines mark the 10th, 50th and 90th
percentiles of the distribution.
Big boxes may
be good news 
for ‘mom-and-
pop’ stores
years, the median size of a store belonging
to a large supermarket chain fell from 75
to 56 employees. This trend contrasts with
the retail chains’ development in other
countries. For example, over a comparable
time period, the average store size of
national retail chains in the United States
increased from 142 to 152 employees
(Haskel et al, 2008).
In my research, I investigate what are
the direct and indirect effects of the new
planning regulations on employment
among independent retailers. In particular,
I estimate the effect of the number of
planning grants won by big boxes on the
employment growth of independent
retailers in a local authority.
This is far from straightforward, as the
same factors can influence both the
number of grants and the growth of
independent retailers. For example, if an
area experiences rising incomes, this will
lead to increasing demand for retail
products, which will be spread across
CentrePiece Autumn 2008
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Ranges
 Over 3.3
 2-3.3
 1.2-2
 0-1.2
Figure 3:
Average number of planning grants for large retail stores
across English local authorities, 1993-2003
Conservative
councils are 
much less likely 
to grant planning
permission for
new big boxes
than other
councils
Note: The figure shows the
substantial variation in
planning grants across the UK.
Each local authority has a
different colour, corresponding
to the average number of
grants they gave over the
period 1993-2003, with darker
colours indicating that more
grants were given.
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both big boxes (thus generating more
planning applications) and small
independent retailers.
To identify whether the number of big
box grants affects the employment
growth of independent retailers, I exploit
the fact that there is a political, as well as
an economic, dimension to the planning
process. The two key assumptions at the
basis of my methodology are that
politicians’ preferences about planning
regulations depend on their party
affiliation, and that the electoral success
of the different parties is independent of
factors that might affect employment
among independent retailers. Under these
circumstances, it becomes possible to use
the political composition of the local
authorities to identify the effect of grants
of big boxes on the employment growth
of independent retailers.
More than any other party in the UK,
the Conservatives have traditionally been
associated with Nimby-ism (‘not in my
backyard’) – a strong opposition towards
new retail developments. Typically justified
on environmental grounds, this also
probably reflects the political weight of
middle-class homeowners, who worry
about the effect on the value of their
properties, and small retailers, who often
fear competition from big boxes.
The influence of Conservative
politicians on local planning activities
affects the number of applications
granted across the UK, leading to
considerable variation in the number of
grants across local authorities (Figure 3).
This is the variation I use to identify the
effect of big boxes on the employment
growth of independent retailers.
I find that the number of successful
planning grants for out-of-town
supermarkets is positively related to the
employment growth of small independent
retailers. This implies that regulation that
prevents the development of more big
boxes may actually harm independent
retailers and the people that they employ. 
A possible interpretation of this result
is that when planning regulations prevent
the entry of large supermarkets, retail
chains move to a business model based
more on smaller in-town stores. These
smaller format stores compete more
directly with independent stores, and
accelerate their decline. 
To provide more evidence of this, I
proceed in two steps. First, I show that
the growth of smaller in-town stores
belonging to retail chains is negatively
associated with the number of big boxes
winning a planning grant. This suggests
that the increasing movement of the
major UK chains towards small
convenience stores can be directly linked
to the increasing planning hurdles faced
by big boxes. 
Second, I look separately at the effect
of big boxes on the entry and exit rates of
retailers into and out of the market, and
on the growth or contraction of retailers
already in the market. Interestingly, there
appears to be almost no effect from more
grants for big boxes on changes in the
size of existing retailers, nor on the
number of new independent retailers that
enter the market.
The entire effect from more big boxes
winning planning permission appears to
come from fewer independent retailers
leaving the market. This suggests that
having more big boxes has the effect of
reducing the total amount of competition
that independent retailers face.
My estimates suggest that the sharp
decline in new big boxes can account for
about 15% of the decline in employment
among independent retailers between
1998 and 2004. It should be stressed that
it is not clear whether all independent
retailers benefit equally from more big
boxes, and it is too early to draw
conclusions about any long-run effects.
But so far, at least, it seems that big
boxes may actually be good news for
‘mom-and-pop’ stores – at least
compared to the likely alternative of more
Tesco Metro stores.
This article summarises ‘Does Planning
Regulation Protect Independent Retailers?’
by Raffaella Sadun, CEP Discussion Paper
No. 888 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0888.pdf).
Raffaella Sadun is a research officer in
CEP’s productivity and innovation
programme.
Further reading
Rachel Griffith and Heike Harmgart (2005)
‘Retail Productivity’, The International
Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer
Research 15(3): 281-90.
Jonathan Haskel, Ron Jarmin, Kazu
Motohashi and Raffaella Sadun (2008) 
‘A Three Country Comparison of the 
Retail Sector Using Micro Data’,
CEP/CeRiBA mimeo.
The fewer big
boxes allowed 
by councils, the
more small chain
stores were
introduced – 
and the more
independent
retailers suffered
More big boxes
being given
planning
permission is
associated with
fewer
independent
retailers being
forced out of
business
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Are the top universities
worth paying for?
From 2006, new UK undergraduates – ‘freshers’ – were
asked to pay up to £3,000 in fees for each year of their
degree. The tripling of tuition fees was politically
contentious at the time. But for many backbench
members of parliament, the key sticking point was not
that universities were allowed to charge much more than
before, but that the £3,000 a year limit represented a cap
not a fixed rate. This established the principle that
different universities could charge different fees.
In the event, only a handful of universities charged fees
below the £3,000 cap. But if the limit were to be raised,
there could be more variation in the fees charged, with
more universities charging a lower fee than the maximum
permitted. Indeed, this might make sense. After all,
universities’ costs vary: the more prestigious ones typically
(but not always) pay higher salaries to their staff and may
want to recoup more of their costs through raising the
fees to the higher levels permitted.
But would this variation in fees be paralleled by a variation
in the benefits that students get from different
universities? For example, does going to a more
prestigious and costly institution pay off in terms of its
graduates receiving a higher salary on entering the labour
market?
We know that the average starting salary of students from
the Russell Group of 20 elite UK universities is higher than
that for students from all other UK universities. But this
could be because the Russell Group universities take
higher calibre, more highly motivated students in the first
place.
Can evidence from the United States help us here? Many
US studies show that the relationship between university
quality and graduate wages is positive, even after
controlling for the high school grades (and therefore
possibly the ability and drive) of each student on entry.
Black and Smith (2006) show that the positive impact
might even be understated, as the studies only use a
single measure of university quality – students’ average
high school test scores.
But we should be careful about assuming that this applies
in the UK. For one thing, similar studies find no effect
from the quality of US high schools on wages (as noted in
Hanushek, 2003). This might be because US high schools
operate in a less competitive market than US universities.
Since UK universities operate in a more centralised, less
competitive system than US universities, there might be
little or no difference to a graduate’s earnings from
attending a prestigious university.
The principal difficulty with establishing whether university
quality affects graduate salaries is that high-quality
universities select (and are selected by) the best students.
But if universities select students entirely on the basis of
things that we can observe – such as their grades at GCSE
and A-level – then we might be able to remove any bias in
the results of our research by controlling for them
appropriately.
To make sure that we fully capture those traits that we
don’t observe – such as ambition and effort – we also
control for background family factors such as parents’
education.
Our study is based on four cohorts of students: those that
graduated in 1985, 1990, 1995 and 1999. The 1995 and
1999 cohorts were surveyed three and four years after
graduation, respectively. These two cohorts are the most
comparable since the surveys were deliberately designed
to be similar.
The 1985 and 1990 cohorts were surveyed 11 and six
years after leaving university, respectively. For both of
these cohorts, we study their wages six years after
graduation (the earlier cohort were asked to recall their
wages six years after they graduated). The differences
between the cohorts mean that we have to be careful
about saying that the ‘returns’ to studying at different
universities have changed over time.
One difficulty for the research is measuring the quality of
an institution. A single measure is likely to be inaccurate,
as quality can be demonstrated in different ways.
With the introduction of tuition fees for undergraduates, the
UK government accepted the principle that since graduates
receive much of the benefit of their degrees, they should be
asked to bear some of the cost. But are degrees from ‘better’
universities worth more than others? Iftikhar Hussain,
Sandra McNally and Shqiponja Telhaj investigate.
in brief...
Going to an ‘elite university’ (in the
top quartile of quality) rather than a
university in the bottom quartile
increases graduate pay by 10-16%.
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Consequently, we use a single composite measure that
combines research quality, the faculty-student ratio,
expenditure per student, the A-level scores of incoming
students and the dropout rate.
The results of our analysis suggest that there is a
significant premium to attending a high-quality university
over an average university in terms of the wages that
graduates can command in the labour market. This implies
that even if two graduates have the same A-level grades
and family background and studied the same degree
subject, they will earn different wages if they went to
different universities. The graduate from the more
prestigious university will, on average, earn more.
Specifically, an increase of one standard deviation in
university quality leads to a roughly 6% increase in
graduate wages. To put this another way, a student who
goes to a university that is in the second highest quartile
(in terms of quality) can expect to earn 5-7% more than a
student with the same parental background and A-levels
who goes to a university in the bottom quartile of quality.
There is also evidence that students who go to the very
best universities can benefit even more: our results
suggest that there may be increasing returns to quality. A
student who attends a university in the top quartile of
quality may earn 10-16% more than a student who
attends a university in the bottom quartile, depending on
the measure of quality used.
Our results indicate that students who go to a top
university do benefit more from their degrees than
students who go to universities of lesser quality. As it
turns out, our estimates for the ‘returns to quality’ are
similar to those found by Black and Smith (2006) for the
United States, as well as those found by Conlon and
Chevalier (2003) for the premium for attending a Russell
Group university in the UK.
As far as we can tell, the returns to going to a better
quality university have increased over time. This may
reflect the large increase in the number of universities in
1992. But because our samples differ so much between
the first two cohorts and the second two, we cannot be
certain about this.
Over a lifetime in the labour market, going to a university
of higher quality can make a big difference to total
income. The average annual earnings of graduates from
the 1999 cohort were £22,828 in 2003 (four years after
graduation). If we assume that the returns to quality are
6% of this amount and that this stays constant in
absolute terms over the total time in the labour market,
this is worth in total £35,207 (assuming 25 years in the
labour market and using a discount rate of 3.5%). Since it
is likely that the premium to going to a higher quality
institution increases over time, this may be an
underestimate.
Such evidence suggests that there is some justice in
requiring graduates to contribute to the cost of their
university education, and in allowing different universities
to charge different fees. That said, we should be clear that
although there are increased average returns to graduates
of higher quality institutions, these are still small in
comparison with the overall value of higher education.
Blundell et al (2005) find that the average returns to
higher education are 48% (of earnings) in comparison
with leaving school at age 16 with no qualifications. If we
translate this into lifetime earnings in the same (very
rough) way, this amounts to a £281,594 difference
between a graduate and a school-leaver. So we can see
that encouraging more people to go into higher education
should still be the major policy priority.
Further reading
Dan Black and Jeffrey Smith (2006) ‘Estimating Returns to
College Quality with Multiple Proxies for Quality’, Journal of
Labor Economics 24(3): 701-28.
Richard Blundell, Lorraine Dearden and Barbara Sianesi
(2005) ‘Measuring the Returns to Education’, in What’s the
Good of Education? The Economics of Education in the UK
edited by Stephen Machin and Anna Vignoles, Princeton
University Press.
Gavan Conlon and Arnaud Chevalier (2003) ‘Does it Pay to
Attend a Prestigious University?’, Centre for the Economics of
Education Discussion Paper No. 33
(http://cee.lse.ac.uk/cee%20dps/ceedp33.pdf).
Eric Hanushek (2003) ‘The Failure of Input-based Schooling
Policies’, Economic Journal 113: F64-98.
This article summarises ‘University Quality and Graduate
Wages in the UK’ by Iftikhar Hussain, Sandra McNally and
Shqiponja Telhaj, Centre for the Economics of Education
Discussion Paper No. 99 (forthcoming). The study was funded
by the Economic and Social Research Council through its
Teaching and Learning research programme.
Iftikhar Hussain is a research economist in CEP’s education
and skills programme. Sandra McNally is director of CEP’s
education and skills programme. Shqiponja Telhaj is a
lecturer in economics at the University of Sussex and a
research economist in CEP’s education and skills programme.
A degree from a top university
is worth more, but a degree
from any university still pays
off in terms of higher earnings
CentrePiece Autumn 2008
8
A
ccurately documenting –
and understanding the
causes of – rising labour
market inequalities have
been a major
preoccupation of CEP researchers over
many years. While the study of wage and
employment structures dates back a long
way in economics (at least as far as Adam
Smith), the large body of more recent
academic literature on rising inequality
began in the early to mid-1990s. It sprang
from a recognition that wage gaps
between higher and lower paid workers
were rapidly widening in a number of
countries, notably the UK and the United
States.
There are at least two main aspects of
this research to which CEP economists
have made significant contributions and
shaped the debate. The first is careful use
of large-scale microeconomic data on
individuals’ wages and employment to
document what happened and to measure
accurately the extent to which the wage
distribution widened.
For many years, economists had
pointed to the stability of the wage
structure. But there was a sense in the late
1980s and early 1990s that things were
changing. In the early to mid-1990s, CEP
researchers Stephen Machin and John
Schmitt (then a doctoral student at CEP
and now a senior economist at the Center
for Economic and Policy Research in
Washington, DC), using data sources such
as the General Household Survey and the
New Earnings Survey, were the first to
document the substantial increase in wage
inequality that had occurred since the late
1970s (Schmitt, 1995; Machin, 1996).
Simultaneously, CEP research fellow
Richard Freeman of Harvard University was
documenting a similar increase in wage
inequality in the United States – which
was worse than in the UK as those at the
bottom were experiencing large real falls
in their earnings.
The second significant contribution
was to develop a better understanding of
the proximate causes of rising wage
inequality. Influential cross-country work
from the late 1980s by Stephen Machin,
John Van Reenen and various co-authors
pinpointed ‘skill-biased technological
change’ as a force operating in the labour
markets of a number of industrialised
countries as generating greater labour
market inequality than in the past (Berman
et al, 1998; Machin and Van Reenen,
1998; Nickell and Van Reenen, 2001). 
This change consists of technological
advances (such as computers) that have
been observed to benefit more skilled or
educated workers and, at the same time,
to be detrimental to the wages and
employment prospects of less skilled or
educated workers. As these technologies
diffused into modern workplaces, the
relative wages of skilled versus unskilled
workers rose or the employment rates of
the skilled versus the less skilled rose – or
in some countries, notably the UK and the
United States, both happened.
CEP researchers have continued to
make significant contributions to this
debate and we now know a lot more than
we did when the initial research was
undertaken. It has become evident that
the sharpest burst of rising wage
inequality in the UK occurred in the
1980s. In that decade, the whole wage
distribution widened as successively higher
percentiles of the wage distribution
experienced higher relative wage growth
(Machin, 1999).
This can be illustrated by thinking of
‘upper tail wage inequality’ as the wage at
the ninetieth percentile (the wage received
by someone 10% below the top of the
wage distribution) relative to the fiftieth
percentile (the person right in the middle),
and ‘lower tail wage inequality’
analogously as the tenth percentile wage
relative to the fiftieth.
Figure 1 shows decade-by-decade
In the second of CEP’s ‘big ideas’ series,
Stephen Machin surveys significant research
findings on wage inequality that have emerged
from the Centre over the past three decades.
Big ideas
Rising wage inequality
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changes in overall, upper tail and lower tail
wage inequality (in annualised percentage
points). In the 1980s, both lower and upper
tail inequality rose significantly as the 90-50
wage differential increased and the 10-50
wage differential fell. A key aspect to this
was rising wage gaps between more and
less educated workers – in other words, the
wage ‘returns’ to education rose.
The next two decades proved
somewhat different, however. In the 1990s,
wage inequality continued to rise but at a
more muted pace. In the 2000s, lower tail
inequality narrowed as the 10-50
differential increased but upper tail
inequality continued to expand.
How does recent research reconcile
these patterns of change? First of all, the
‘naïve’ story of skill-biased technological
change has evolved into a more nuanced
one. It may be more plausible to think of
technological advances as damaging the
wage and employment prospects for
workers in jobs that can be replaced by
machines and computers – those jobs that
require workers to perform routine tasks.
At the same time, jobs requiring workers to
do more complex, non-routine tasks cannot
be replaced or downgraded in terms of the
wages they pay in the same way.
Figure 1:
Overall, upper tail and lower tail wage inequality rose
significantly in the 1980s and at a slower pace in the
1990s; in the 2000s, lower tail inequality fell while upper
tail inequality continued to rise
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So it was not only unskilled workers
on the production line who saw their jobs
disappear and wages fall, but also those
relatively skilled workers like bank clerks
who performed routine clerical tasks.
Their jobs were increasingly replaced by
new information technology such as 
ATM machines.
CEP work by Maarten Goos and 
Alan Manning showed that this process
effectively caused a polarisation of the
labour market (Goos and Manning,
2007). At the top end of the occupational
structure, job growth since the late 1970s
has been rapid – and wages have risen
significantly. But the middle has hollowed
out, as the jobs that could be replaced by
automation have been lost. At the bottom
end, there remain jobs that cannot be
replaced by machines or computers – like
cleaning or caring jobs – and the demand
for some very low wage jobs has risen.
While we can say that the significant
growth in upper tail inequality in the UK
since the late 1970s was down in large
part to skill-biased technological change,
we had to find other mechanisms to
explain the big rise in lower tail inequality
in the 1980s and the subsequent bounce
back of the 2000s. Here CEP research
pointed to changes in the role of labour
market institutions, in which there have
been two important episodes.
First, the rapid decline of trade
unions, which had traditionally propped
up the wages and employment of low-
skilled workers, played a role in rising
lower tail inequality. Second, as
documented in research by Richard
Dickens and Alan Manning, the
introduction of the National Minimum
Wage in April 1999 has been important in
securing sizeable relative wage gains for
low paid workers in the 2000s and thus
contributed to the more recent narrowing
of lower tail inequality (Dickens and
Manning, 2004).
Where does this leave us today? CEP
research on this important question has
been vital in documenting and explaining
why labour market inequalities have risen
over time in the UK, and in placing this
rise into its appropriate international
context. But many important issues are
still outstanding.
For example, our work found that the
role of developing countries and foreign
competition in fostering lower wages for
the less skilled in the UK was, perhaps
surprisingly, minimal. Although in theory,
trading with poorer countries could lead
to the wages of unskilled British workers
‘being set in Beijing’, this did not seem to
be happening.
But this literature mainly pre-dated
the rise of China and India in the mid-
1990s, and ignored some of the ways in
which trade itself could stimulate greater
technical change. Both these issues are
being pursued in our future work using
new sources of data.
In conclusion, our work has shown
that the recent rises in UK wage
inequality have mainly been due to a
combination of skill-biased technological
change and institutional changes affecting
the labour market. But what kind of
policies could be implemented to reverse
the trend in inequality?
The long-term policy has to be the
building up of human capital. But what is
the best way to do this? In the shorter
term, reform of labour market institutions
such as the minimum wage and trade
unions could also be important. We will
turn to policies with the potential to
tackle distributional problems in future
issues of CentrePiece.
Further reading
Eli Berman, John Bound and Stephen Machin
(1998) ‘Implications of Skill-biased
Technological Change: International
Evidence’, Quarterly Journal of Economics
113: 1245-80.
Richard Dickens and Alan Manning (2004)
‘The National Minimum Wage and Wage
Inequality’, Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society Series A 167.
Maarten Goos and Alan Manning (2007)
‘Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The Rising
Polarization of Work in Britain’, Review of
Economics and Statistics 89: 118-33.
Stephen Machin (1996) ‘Wage Inequality in
the UK’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 7:
49-62.
Stephen Machin (1999) ‘Wage Inequality in
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s’, in The State of
Working Britain edited by Paul Gregg and
Jonathan Wadsworth, Manchester University
Press.
Stephen Machin and John Van Reenen (1998)
‘Technology and Changes in Skill Structure:
Evidence from Seven OECD Countries’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 113: 1215-44.
Stephen Nickell and John Van Reenen (2001)
‘Technological Innovation and Economic
Performance in the United Kingdom’, in
Technological Innovation and Economic
Performance edited by Benn Steil, David
Victor and Richard Nelson, Princeton
University Press.
John Schmitt (1995) ‘The Changing Structure
of Male Earnings in Britain, 1974-88’, in
Differences and Changes in Wage Structures
edited by Richard Freeman and Lawrence
Katz, University of Chicago Press.
Stephen Machin is research director of CEP
and professor of economics at University
College London.
The long-term policy response to
rising inequality has to be the
building up of human capital
CentrePiece Autumn 2008
11
This three-day conference debated all aspects of the
impact of the emerging economic powers on Europe and
the United States and the changes within India and 
China themselves. A highlight of the conference was a
policy panel featuring Athar Hussain of LSE’s Asia
Observatory, Alan Winters, recently appointed chief
economist at the UK’s Department for International
Development, Martin Wolf of the Financial Times and 
Yale professor Peter Schott.
CEP’s director John Van Reenen, chaired a lively discussion,
which he kicked off by asking three questions about
lessons for growth, the effect of globalisation on
inequality and threats to the political coalition for
globalisation.
The panellists focused on the fact that the lessons from
China and India’s development may be limited for other
countries. A key factor has certainly been an emphasis 
on exports, a degree of opening up of markets to 
imports and some liberalisation of the economy. But China
has embarked on a more classical development path
through manufacturing exports, whereas India’s growth
has been startlingly service-driven, a very new mode 
of development.
There was some dispute over the role of trade in driving
inequality in the rich countries. Martin Wolf argued for
technology having the major role whereas the other
panellists saw a greater role for trade. John Van Reenen’s
research shows that the two are inter-related: trade with
China appears to have stimulated faster technological
progress in the West.
Although the panel agreed that the prospects for the
Doha round were grim, Martin Wolf pointed to the fact
that globalisation had created footloose multinationals
with much less vested interest in protectionism in any one
country. This by itself undermined one of the key lobbies
against trade – vested domestic business interests.
The conference on the emergence of China and India in the
global economy was co-organised by Stephen Redding and
John Van Reenen of CEP. Full details on the conference are
available here: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/events/event.asp?id=50
The emergence of 
China and India in 
the global economy
July 2008 conference
CHINA
INDIACHINDIA
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The gap in income between rich people and the average
Briton has widened very markedly over the last three
decades. Andreas Georgiadis and Alan Manning wonder
why voters have not forced successive governments to
increase taxes on the rich.
‘I warn you that there are going to be howls of
anguish from those rich enough to pay over 75%
on their last slice of earnings.’
Denis Healey, Labour Party Shadow Chancellor, 1973.
‘The justice for me is concentrated on lifting
incomes of those that don't have a decent income.
It's not my burning ambition to make sure that
David Beckham earns less money.’
Tony Blair, Labour Party Leader, 2001 election campaign.
Spend it like Beckham
The gap in income between rich people and the average
Briton has widened very markedly over the last three
decades. In the early 1970s, the top 10% received 
about one quarter of total income but their proportion 
of total income now is more like one third. We might
expect that the political response to this – at least from a
Labour government – would take the form of more
redistribution, including higher marginal tax rates for the
rich. But this has not happened.
The simplest way to see it is that the top rate of income
tax fell from 83% in the late 1970s to 40% in 1988 –
since when it has not changed. There is now no major
political party proposing substantial rises in the top
marginal rate of income tax. Looking across the tax and
benefit system, we can see that redistribution has not
increased even as inequality has risen.
In a democracy, it is the voters in the middle (the median
voter) who have the most influence since they are the
‘swing’ voters who determine the outcomes of elections.
And as the median voter has a below average income
(due to a handful of super-rich people), we might expect
them to put pressure on the government to redistribute
resources from the rich to themselves. According to this
view, a rise in income inequality will lead to more
redistribution as the median voter tries to get a slice of
the extra pie going to the rich.
Of course, there is substantial redistribution: the share of
the top 10% in final income is about one quarter, which
is considerably lower than their one third share in original
income. But the prediction that more inequality will lead
to more redistribution is not supported by the evidence.
Not only has redistribution in the UK failed to keep pace
with rising inequality, but there is also little evidence that
it applies across other countries. Perhaps the starkest
comparison is between the United States and Europe: the
former has higher levels of inequality than the latter and
less redistribution. 
So why has the rise in inequality in the UK been met with
so little demand for higher taxes on the rich? One view
might be that our democracy is closer to ‘one pound, one
vote’ instead of ‘one person, one vote’. If this were so,
then a rise in the share of income going to the rich
would also lead to a rise in their share of political power,
hence potentially explaining the lack of a redistributive
response.
Our research has been considering other possible
explanations. We analyse the British Social Attitudes
Survey (BSAS) to see whether attitudes towards
redistributive taxation have been changing.
The answer is that they have. Figure 1 shows the average
response of individuals to the statement ‘government
should redistribute income from the better-off to those
that are less well-off’ from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) through
to 5 (‘strongly agree’) – so that higher average values
represent a greater demand for redistribution.
Figure 1 indicates that the demand for redistribution fell
in the early 1980s but then rose from the mid-1980s to
in brief...
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the mid-1990s. This was the period in which inequality
grew fastest and it seems likely that the lack of
redistribution by the Thatcher and Major governments
was not particularly popular. 
Tony Blair inherited a large demand from voters for more
redistribution in 1997. Since the election of New Labour,
support for redistribution plummeted to a new low. One
explanation might be that the Labour government
succeeded in redistributing income so that voters’
demand were met. But the data suggest that little has
actually happened to inequality or redistribution since
1997.
There has been some redistribution towards children in
poverty and poor pensioners. But these are relatively
small deals in the big scheme – the underlying trends in
inequality in the economy as a whole. We are left with
the job of explaining the puzzle that inequality now is
much higher than in the 1970s but the demand for
redistribution is much lower.
What determines attitudes towards redistribution? Our
analysis of the BSAS indicates a number of important
factors, all in line with the theory of the median voter:
 First, your personal circumstances – the rich are
markedly less in favour of redistribution than the poor.
 Second, if you care a lot about the poor or are very
envious of the rich, it is quite likely that you support a
lot of redistribution.
 Third, if you believe that high taxes discourage work,
then you are less likely to support redistribution.
 Finally, if you think the government cannot be trusted,
then you are not likely to support as much
redistribution. 
The views of the British population have changed over
time and our analysis attempts to link the fall in the
demand for redistribution to changing attitudes. We find
that we can do a pretty good job: changes in attitudes
towards redistribution can explain almost two thirds of
the decline in the demand for redistribution in the UK.
The single most important change is that many fewer
people now seem to believe in the ‘class war’ – that there
is one law for the poor and one for the rich, or that big
business benefits owners at the expense of workers.
So people’s beliefs are as important as their economic
circumstances in explaining attitudes to political issues
like redistribution. And these beliefs can change fast.
That politics is a battle for ‘hearts and minds’ is not
surprising, but why have the beliefs of British voters
changed in this way?
It seems that British views are becoming more like the
views of Americans: those in the middle are no longer
envious of the rich – instead they aspire to be the rich.
But as we enter a recession in which the average Briton is
quite likely to feel the pinch, it may once again become
an attractive political policy to seek to increase the share
of taxes paid by the rich.
This article summarises ‘Spend It
Like Beckham? Inequality and
Redistribution in the UK, 1983-
2004’ by Andreas Georgiadis and
Alan Manning, CEP Discussion
Paper No. 816 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
pubs/download/dp0816.pdf).
Andreas Georgiadis is a 
research economist in CEP’s 
labour markets programme.
Alan Manning is director of CEP’s
labour markets programme.
Figure 1:
Agreement with the statement that ‘government should
redistribute income from the better off to those that are
less well-off’ (1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree)
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Voters seem to value redistribution less – and 
this is the main reason why it hasn’t increased
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S
ince 1997, the government
has launched a variety of
initiatives designed to
improve the life chances of
poor children. The logic was
clear: every child should have an equal
chance to succeed in life regardless of how
well-off their parents are. Whether parental
background is becoming more or less
important in determining child outcomes is
of interest in itself, and it may help us to
evaluate the policy initiatives designed to
increase social mobility from one
generation to the next.
We have shown in work with Paul
Gregg (Blanden et al, 2005, 2007) that, on
average, the life chances of a child born
into a poor household in 1970 were worse
than those of a child born into a similar
household in 1958. In particular, we
showed that the earnings of individuals
born in 1970 were more strongly related to
the income of their parents than those of
the earlier cohort. But until now, we have
not been able to assess whether
intergenerational mobility has declined
further since then. 
To do so is especially important since
children even from the second cohort
would have been in their late twenties by
the time New Labour came to power in
1997 and would not have been affected
by policies such as Sure Start (which
provided services for pre-school age
children) and the Excellence in Cities
programme (which directed more resources
to inner city schools).
Our new study, funded by the Sutton
Trust, uses more recent data to attempt to
determine what has happened to social
mobility since 1970. It uses information on
the children of both the 1958 and 1970
cohorts: on average, the children of 
those born in 1958 were born in 1985,
and the children of the 1970 cohort were
born in 1999.
In addition, we use information on
young adults from the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS), a nationally
representative sample of 5,500
households, as well as children born in
2000 and 2001 from the Millennium
Cohort Study.
One problem with looking at the
mobility of these later cohorts is that
children born recently have not entered the
labour market yet. So instead, we
investigate the link between parents’
income and the intermediate outcomes of
their offspring. These outcomes include
acquiring a degree by the age of 23,
cognitive test scores during the early years,
and parents’ reports of behaviour during
childhood. 
We then analyse whether the link
between parental income and these
outcomes has been strengthening over
time based on the principle that if the
relationship has strengthened, then this is
likely to lead to a decrease in
intergenerational mobility later in life. We
can check if this principle is true by using
the 1958 and 1970 cohorts, for which we
It was CEP research that first established that
the life chances of children born into poor
households in 1970 were worse than those 
for children born twelve years earlier.
Now Jo Blanden and Stephen Machin look 
at more recent evidence to find out what
happened to the life chances of children born
into poor families since then.
Recent trends in intergenerational mobility:
Will the downward 
trend continue?
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Figure 2 repeats this exercise for
reading test scores (at age 11 in the 1958
cohort and age 10 in the 1970 cohort) and
shows the average test score percentile
achieved by those from different
backgrounds. Inequality also grows across
the cohorts by this measure. 
We then compare the changing
relationship between these outcomes 
and family income between 1958 and
1970 with recent trends. If intermediate
outcomes are ever more strongly related 
to parental income, this suggests that 
the trend of declining social mobility 
has continued. 
A key assumption is that educational
outcomes for children are a good 
(and reasonably constant) predictor of
what they will earn as adults. This 
has been borne out by other studies: 
the more educated you are, the more 
you earn.
have information on intermediate
outcomes and for whom we know that
intergenerational income mobility fell. 
Figures 1 and 2 show how the
intermediate outcomes that we use are
related to parental income. Figure 1 
shows that although children born in 1970
were more likely to have a degree by the
age of 23 than children born in 1958, 
the growth in degree-level education 
was strongest among those from the
richest backgrounds. 
Although 7% of children born in 
1970 from the poorest fifth of households
had a degree (up from 5% of the 
children born 12 years earlier), degree
attainment from those from rich
backgrounds grew much more quickly:
from 20% to 37%. So inequality in degree
attainment widened from 15 percentage
points to 30 percentage points between
the two cohorts.
Figure 3 compares the degree
achievement of the 1970 cohort with that
of more recent ‘pseudo-cohorts’ drawn
from the BHPS. Unlike the earlier period,
there is little to suggest that the gap
between the rich and the poor (in terms of
degree attainment) widened. Indeed, the
gap in degree attainment between children
from the poorest households and the
richest remains static between the 1970
cohort and the first BHPS sample (who are
on average six years younger).
The gap appears to widen slightly
between the first and second BHPS groups,
but the change is too small for us to rule
out the possibility that it is an artefact of
the data. So the recent evidence should be
interpreted as ‘no change’: it appears
(from this measure at least) as though the
decline in intergenerational mobility has
been arrested.
Degree attainment is only one of the
Inequality in degree
attainment and test
scores widened
between the 1958 and
1970 cohorts
Figure 1:
Inequality in degree attainment – 1958 and 1970 cohorts
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Figure 2:
Inequality in test score percentiles – 1958 and 1970 cohorts
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intermediate outcomes in which we are
interested. But as it turns out, the story
from the other measures is similar: the gap
between rich and poor children has not
widened in recent years. 
Figure 4 shows this for test score
performance at around the age of 5. The
bars look almost identical across the three
datasets, indicating that there has been no
change in the relationship between test
scores and family income in the cohorts
born from the mid-1980s to the turn of
the millennium.
Evidence from behavioural tests
confirms and consolidates our findings.
The relationship between family income
and externalising or ‘acting out’ behaviour
increases in the earlier cohorts but shows
no change for those born since the mid-
1980s.
As far as we can tell, therefore, it
seems that our previous finding of a fall in
intergenerational mobility between the
1958 and 1970 cohorts will not continue
for children born more recently. Looking at
the connection between intervening
factors - educational attainment, test
scores and behavioural measures - and
family income for more recent cohorts we
find little evidence of change.
It appears that the decline in social
mobility may well have flattened out. This
may be either good or bad news for policy:
while it may have stopped the previous
decline, it has failed to lead to an overall
improvement in mobility. 
CentrePiece Autumn 2008
16
This article summarises ‘Up and Down the
Generational Income Ladder in Britain: Past
Changes and Future Prospects’ by Jo Blanden
and Stephen Machin, National Institute
Economic Review 205: 101-17. This work
originally appeared in December 2007 as the
Sutton Trust report ‘Recent Evidence on
Intergenerational Mobility’. The authors
gratefully acknowledge the financial support
of the Trust.
Jo Blanden is a lecturer in economics at the
University of Surrey and a research associate
in CEP’s education and skills programme.
Stephen Machin is research director of CEP
and professor of economics at University
College London.
Further reading
Jo Blanden, Paul Gregg and Stephen Machin
(2005) ‘Educational Inequality and
Intergenerational Mobility’, in What’s the
Good of Education? The Economics of
Education in the UK edited by Stephen
Machin and Anna Vignoles, Princeton
University Press.
Jo Blanden, Paul Gregg and Lindsey
Macmillan (2007) ‘Accounting for
Intergenerational Persistence: Non-cognitive
Skills, Ability and Education’, Economic
Journal conference volume: C43-60.
Figure 3:
Inequality in degree achievement - 1970 onwards
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Figure 4:
Inequality in test score percentiles - more recent cohorts
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The fall in
intergenerational
mobility between
the 1958 and
1970 cohorts has
not continued for
children born
more recently
O
n 23 June 2008, the
Prime Minister gave a
flagship speech to school
leaders in which he said
that ‘raising social
mobility in our country is a national
crusade in which everyone can join and
play their part’ and pledged that a White
Paper on social mobility would be
produced by the end of the year.
On the same day, CEP – which has
been at the forefront of recent research
into intergenerational mobility – hosted 
a one-day conference on the subject, 
co-organised with the Centre for
Longitudinal Studies at the Institute for
Education. The day brought together
many of the leading academics in the field
– what Polly Toynbee described in The
Guardian as ‘a roll call of top sociologists
and economists’.
The first session contrasted the
approaches and results from the
sociological and economic approaches to
measuring intergenerational mobility. Colin
Mills presented joint work with John
Goldthorpe from the sociological side
while Jo Blanden provided the economists’
perspective, presenting a paper she has
written with Paul Gregg and Lindsey
Macmillan. Discussion from Robin Naylor
and John Hills brought out the similarities
and differences in findings and approach.
Paul Gregg and Lindsey Macmillan
then brought the evidence on
intergenerational mobility right up to date,
looking at how the relationship between
family background and educational
achievements has changed under New
Labour and the implications of this for
future mobility. Miles Corak gave the last
paper of the morning, showcasing
Canadian data which indicates that 
40% of men follow their father into the
same firm. 
In the afternoon, Marco Francesconi
presented joint work with John Ermisch,
using data from the Millennium Cohort
Study to examine the impact of family
background on birth weight, one of the
very earliest ways in which family
investments can influence children’s
outcomes. Maia Güell followed with a
paper (joint with Sevi Mora and Chris
Telmer) showing how the ability of
surnames to explain income in the
population is related to, and can estimate,
intergenerational mobility from one
generation to the next. 
Steve Nickell responded by questioning
the worth of estimating intergenerational
mobility, arguing that one number is
insufficient to capture all the complex
social and economic processes involved. 
In the discussion that followed,
intergenerational elasticity was compared
with the growth rate and the Gini
coefficient measure of inequality as one of
the essential statistics that describe an
economy.
The final academic paper of the day
was by Anders Björklund (joint with Lena
Lindahl and Matthew Lindquist), using
data from Sweden to explore the value of
sibling correlations in income as an
alternative measure of mobility.
The audience for the day came from a
broad background: representatives of
charities, thinktanks and government
departments were present, alongside
academics from across the UK. In
recognition of this, the conference aimed
to combine academic papers with a
broader discussion of the policy
implications of social mobility research.
To this end, the day closed with a
roundtable discussion chaired by Stephen
Aldridge of the Cabinet Office. Academics
Stephen Machin and John Goldthorpe set
the scene by building a bridge between
the academic and policy viewpoints.
Contributions then followed from Liberal
Democrat MP Lynne Featherstone,
Conservative MP David Willetts, Lee Elliot
Major of the Sutton Trust and Polly
Toynbee. 
Social mobility remains at the top of
the policy agenda and the discussions at
CEP have contributed to bringing the
academic and policy communities a little
closer together in their thoughts. 
The conference on intergenerational mobility
was co-organised by Jo Blanden of CEP and
Kirstine Hansen of the Centre for
Longitudinal Studies at the Institute for
Education. Further information is available
here: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/events/
event.asp?id=48
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Intergenerational mobility
June 2008 conference
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The British public is increasingly sceptical
that official inflation numbers reflect the true
rise in the cost of living. Nicholas Oulton
explains the problems in creating an accurate
measure of inflation, and outlines a new
method of measuring rising prices.
How to measure 
the rising cost of living
W
hen I tell my friends
that I have been
studying the
problem of path-
dependence bias in
chain index numbers of the cost of living,
their eyes tend to glaze over. But aside
from its purely intellectual interest, the
study of cost-of-living (and other) index
numbers has many important practical
implications. After all, whenever you read
that the consumer prices index (CPI) rose
at an annual rate of 2.5% last month or
that GDP in the first quarter rose by 1.5%,
you are being told something about index
numbers. 
To what extent do price indices like
the retail prices index (RPI), used to update
pensions and social security benefits in
Britain, or the CPI, used by the Bank of
England as its inflation target, measure the
true cost of living? An index is a group (or
‘basket’) of goods, and by measuring the
price change of each good you can
estimate the price change of all. But
because some goods take up a larger
proportion of our disposable income than
others, we need to adjust (or ‘weight’) the
index to reflect this.
In the past, such price indices quickly
became out-of-date as they were based
on a fixed basket of goods: the weight of
different goods in the baskets didn’t
change over time. And as people tend to
substitute goods that have quickly rising
prices for ones that have slowly rising
prices, the share of our spending that
each good takes up varies, and becomes
less and less similar to that of the original
index.
So in Britain the basket of goods is not
fixed but is changed every year in line with
the latest spending patterns – in the
jargon, the CPI or the RPI is a chain index.
But conventional price indices like the CPI
and the RPI, considered as measures of the
true cost of living, do suffer from what I
call ‘path-dependence bias’. This second
type of bias arises because the poor spend
their money in different ways from the
rich, even when both face the same
prices. 
One of the earliest and most robust
empirical findings in economics is Engel’s
Law, named for an 1857 study by Ernst
Engel of household budgets in Saxony.
Engel found that richer households spent
more on food but that the richer the
household, the lower the share of food in
total expenditure.
Engel’s study is not just of historical
interest. The share of the household
budget devoted to food in Britain has
fallen by around half in the last 30 years
and it’s likely that this is mostly due to the
rising average level of prosperity over this
period. 
Engel’s Law illustrates a general
problem with measuring the cost of living.
Consider a household with a very low
standard of living, spending say 60% of its
budget on food, just like the majority of
the households Engel studied in 1857 or
indeed hundreds of millions of people in
poor countries today. Suppose the price of
food rises by 20%, with other prices
remaining unchanged. Then money
income will probably have to rise by close
to 12% (0.60 x 20%), to leave the
standard of living unchanged.
Notice that we can’t say it must rise by
exactly 12% since it might be possible for
the household to substitute some other
goods for food. For example, the need for
food could be reduced a little by burning
more fuel (this is the substitution bias
point). But at such a low standard of
living, the substitution possibilities are
clearly limited. 
Compare this household with a
modern day British one, spending only
15% of its budget on food. Now the
maximum rise in income required to
maintain the standard of living intact is
only 3% (0.15 x 20%). In fact, it may be a
good bit less as substitution opportunities
are greater: if the price of food rises,
households can buy cheap food instead of
expensive food (more bread and less meat)
or substitute other products for food,
though poorer households will obviously
find this harder than richer ones. 
The general point is that though prices
tend to rise over time, they don’t all rise at
the same rate. The increase in the cost of
living depends on the pattern of
expenditure; this pattern differs between
richer and poorer households and also
changes as the average standard of living
rises over time. So a single number that
tries to measure the change in the cost of
living will be necessarily inaccurate, as
poor families spend their money on
different things than rich families do. 
So when we find that a conventional
price index like the RPI has risen at an
average rate of about 6% per year over
the period 1974-2004, the key question is:
whose standard of living is being taken as
the base for measuring the cost of living?
The answer is, roughly, that of someone
with the average standard of living in the
middle of this period – around 1989.
But what’s so special about 1989?
Why not take the viewpoint of people
today, who are of course considerably
richer on average than their counterparts
in 1989? Or the viewpoint of people in
1974, who were considerably poorer? 
Because people’s incomes change over
time, so do their spending habits. But if
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From 1974 to
today, inflation
in the UK 
has hurt the
poor more than
the rich
we want a true picture of how the cost of
living is changing, this change in incomes
confuses things. We can’t simply use the
original shares of each item in the
household budget (in the base year, here
1974) as substitution bias means that the
price index will overstate the cost of living:
people would naturally buy fewer of the
goods that have seen quickly rising prices.
But we shouldn’t really use the actual
budget shares in 2004 either, as this will
lead to path-dependence bias – since
people now are richer than they were in
1974, they want to buy different things.
What we would ideally like to 
know are the hypothetical budget shares:
what the shares would have been if 
prices were at their actual level in 2004
but the standard of living had been 
at its 1974 level (or any other year taken
as the point of comparison). Of course
these hypothetical shares cannot be
directly observed. 
Fortunately, there is a way of
estimating the hypothetical shares
indirectly. This can be done using only
available data, namely prices and (actual)
budget shares. When the hypothetical
shares have been estimated, we can
construct an RPI for any level of the
standard of living we like.
For example, taking 1974 as the base
year for the standard of living, we could
ask: by how much would the income of a
household with the typical 1974 standard
of living have to rise in order for it to
enjoy the same standard of living at the
prices of 2004? The same could apply to
any other year. 
Figure 1 shows the results of
estimating an RPI appropriate to the
standard of living of each year between
1974 to 2004. It reveals a very interesting
pattern. The growth rate of the cost of
living tends to be higher the further 
back in time the base year is. As incomes
have grown steadily over time, this implies
that the rise in the cost of living was
greatest if we take the viewpoint of the
poorest (the British in 1974) than if we
take the viewpoint of the richest (the
British in 2004).
In other words, over this period,
inflation hurt the poor more than the rich.
The difference between the highest and
the lowest inflation rate is around 0.5%
per year: this is the maximum size of the
path-dependence bias. 
This method can also be applied
between countries. Policy towards poverty
and development should be informed by
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Figure 1:
Average growth rate of true cost-of-living index, 1974-2004
by base year for standard of living (per cent per year)
the size of the gap between the rich and
the poor – and so how the cost of living is
changing for different groups is important,
not least due to the rapidly rising food
prices that we are seeing at the moment.
But exactly the same problem of 
path-dependence bias arises here too. 
And the bias is potentially much larger:
across the globe, living standards vary by
much more than they did over the period
1974-2004 in Britain, during which they
approximately doubled. 
The World Bank has just completed
the latest and fullest round of the
International Comparison Program, which
has delivered detailed price and spending
comparisons for virtually every country 
of any size in the world, including 
(for the first time) China. Applying the
new method to these data will allow us 
to develop better measures of living
standards across the globe. 
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Accurate
measurement 
of the rising 
cost of living in
the developing
world is needed
to inform
development
policy
This article summarises ‘Chain Indices of the
Cost of Living and the Path-dependence
Problem: An Empirical Solution’ by Nicholas
Oulton, CEP Discussion Paper No. 797
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0797.pdf) and Journal of Econometrics
144(1): 306-24 (May 2008).
Nicholas Oulton is a senior visiting research
fellow at CEP.
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John McCain and Barack Obamaare spending the lion’s share oftheir time on the campaign trailin just a few states – because it is 
only these so-called ‘swing states’
that could conceivably vote for either
candidate. Neither candidate is likely to
devote many resources to New York
(safely Democrat) or South Carolina 
(solid Republican).
But do swing states just receive more
visits from presidential hopefuls come
election time, or does their electoral
importance translate into something
more tangible? In particular, is it possible
that swing states with concentrations of
certain industries, notably those that are
fast becoming uncompetitive in the face
of cheaper imports from China and
elsewhere, are able to push for
protectionist trade policies?
In 2002, President Bush introduced
tariffs of up to 30% on imported steel. It
seemed to many that the president was
less worried about supposed dumping
(the ostensible reason for the tariffs)
than the potential loss of jobs in ‘rust
belt’ swing states like Michigan, Ohio,
Pennsylvania and West Virginia.
The World Trade Organisation (WTO)
ruled that the tariffs were not justified,
and allowed the European Union (EU) to
retaliate. The EU leaders were certainly
under the impression that President Bush
was following political incentives, as
their proposed retaliatory tariffs were
targeted at goods exported from other
key swing states, such as oranges
(Florida) and cars (Michigan). The
president duly repealed the steel tariffs.
The attention paid to swing states,
especially large swing states (which have
more votes in the ‘electoral college’ that
ultimately chooses the president), should
not be understated. Florida was the most
intensively contested state in the 2004
election, receiving a fifth of all candidate
visits and more than a quarter (27%) of
all money spent on television advertising.
According to data from ‘Who Picks the
President?’, a report by FairVote
As the US election campaign approaches its
climax, the presidential candidates jet from one
battleground state to the next trying to drum up
support. Research by Mirabelle Muûls and
Dimitra Petropoulou finds that the US
government is more likely to try to protect
industries concentrated in these states.
Do swing states
influence trade policy?
Industries that employ many
people in politically decisive states
are more likely to be protected
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protection by incumbent governments so
as to attract votes. If we are right, then
industries that receive protection are
those which employ many people.
We first show, using a model of the
electoral college, that an incumbent
president has a strong incentive to
manipulate trade policy so as to build a
reputation of protectionism with the
electorate, especially in the large swing
states. By signalling his preferences on
trade policy, an incumbent president (or
party) can influence swing voters and the
chances of re-election. This theoretical
work lends support to the hypothesis that
the 2002 US steel tariffs were introduced
for reasons of political expediency.
We test our theory by looking at the
1984 presidential election. This election,
between Ronald Reagan (the Republican
incumbent) and Walter Mondale
(Democrat), provides as good a set of
data as any to test the hypothesis that
industries concentrated in states expected
(www.fairvote.org/presidential), this was
more money than was spent on
advertising in 45 other states and the
District of Columbia combined.
The map shows the swing states,
such as Florida with 27 electoral votes, 
in yellow, while blue and red states
denote the Democratic and Republican
‘safe states’, respectively, such as
California (55 electoral votes) and Texas
(34 electoral votes).
Previous research has tried to 
explain US trade policy by looking 
at the role of political lobbying. 
The thesis is simple: industries that are
represented by stronger lobbies on
Capitol Hill are more likely to be
protected. Our work investigates another
potential channel: the strong incentives
for presidential candidates to try to win
over certain states.
Our hypothesis is that industries
which employ many people in the key
swing states are more likely to receive
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Figure 1:
2004 US presidential election: Bush versus Kerry
 ‘Safe’ Republican states
 ‘Safe’ Democrat states
 Potential swing states in the 2004 election
Subtle non-tariff barriers
allow presidents to get around
World Trade Organisation
rules on protection
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to be both swing and decisive are more
likely to be protected.
Using data for 1983 (the year
preceding the poll), we construct a
measure of which industries were
concentrated in which states. Our
measure is based on employment, as
workers are voters. In particular, the
higher the proportion of employment in
any given industry in a swing state, 
the higher we expect its electoral
influence to be.
We combine these employment data
with a measure of each state’s joint
probability of being both swing and
decisive in the 1984 election. At that
time, Texas, with 29 electoral votes, was
the most contentious state, with the
highest joint probability of being both
swing and decisive, followed closely by
Pennsylvania and California, while Florida
emerges as the seventh most swing and
decisive state.
The White House could not easily
introduce tariffs to protect the relevant
industries, as such barriers would be
illegal under WTO rules. But there are
other, more subtle non-tariff barriers to
protect industries. These can take many
forms, such as anti-dumping measures 
or countervailing duties, as well as
requirements on how a good is produced,
or its quality, preventing the import of
goods that do not meet such
specifications. 
Our results show that while lobbies
are important in determining the ‘industry
non-tariff barrier coverage ratio’ (our
measure of protection), industries that
employ many workers in swing states
(especially those that carry a larger weight
in the electoral college) enjoy higher levels
of protection than others. 
So it appears that the electoral college
system that determines the outcome of
the US presidential election creates
incentives for presidents to intervene in
favour of industries in swing and decisive
states. As the campaign season reaches its
climax, it appears that politics could
trump economics in the setting of trade
policy. John McCain, a supporter of free
trade, acknowledges that ‘globalisation
will not automatically benefit every
American (worker)’, while Barack 
Obama has stated that if elected
president, he ‘will not sign another trade
agreement unless it has… protections for
American workers’. 
The electoral college system
creates incentives for
presidents to intervene 
in favour of industries in
swing states
Mirabelle Muûls is an associate of CEP’s
globalisation programme and a research
associate at the Grantham Institute for
Climate Change, Imperial College London.
Dimitra Petropoulou is a stipendiary
lecturer in economics at Hertford College,
University of Oxford.
This article summarises ‘A Swing-state
Theory of Trade Protection in the Electoral
College’ by Mirabelle Muûls and Dimitra
Petropoulou, CEP Discussion Paper No. 849
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0849.pdf)
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By influencing market expectations of future
interest rates, central bank communications
have become a key tool of monetary policy-
making. Research by Carlo Rosa finds that
announcements by the US Federal Reserve
move market interest rates significantly more
than comparable announcements from the
European Central Bank.
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Words that work:
comparing the effectiveness of 
central bank communications
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O
ver the past few years,
financial market
participants – especially
those active in the bond
markets – have benefited
from increased transparency from central
banks about how they set monetary
policy. Alongside their interest rate
decisions, central banks increasingly
publish detailed explanatory documents,
such as the Bank of England’s quarterly
Inflation Report.
Central banks have tried to become
more transparent about their future
monetary policy intentions in part because
expectations of future interest rate
decisions are priced into today’s money
markets – and so, in theory at least,
communication can be a tool to tighten or
loosen policy, as much as actually altering
the key policy rate.
Of particular note are central banks’
‘balance-of-risk’ statements –
announcements about the likelihood of a
future increase or decrease in the target
rate. These are used by market
participants to predict the future direction
of interest rates. 
The fundamental question for central
bankers is whether (and to what extent)
financial markets react to their
announcements over and above any
change in the interest rate itself. For
example, the statement following the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
meeting on 28 January 2004 led to one of
the largest reactions in the bond market in
the past 15 years: no less than a 25 basis
point increase (one quarter of one
percentage point) in the five-year Treasury
bond rate in the half-hour surrounding 
the announcement. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, this
reaction was spurred by the Fed’s words
rather than its deeds. As market
participants expected, the FOMC did not
change its target interest rate. Instead, it
was the decision to replace the phrase
‘policy accommodation can be maintained
for a considerable period’ in its
accompanying statement with ‘the
Committee believes it can be patient in
removing its policy accommodation’ that
led market participants to revise upwards
their expectations of future interest rates.
Are the words of central bankers
always heeded in this way? And are the
words of some central banks more effective
than others? To answer these questions, my
research looks at the communication
strategies of the European Central Bank
(ECB) and the Fed. I also directly compare
the ability of the ECB and the Fed to affect
market rates using deeds (changes in the
present target rate) or words (balance-of-
risk statements).
I find that the Fed is much more
effective than the ECB at steering market
interest rates on bonds of all maturities.
Figure 1 provides a graphical comparison of
the average total effects of central bank
words and deeds on interest rates both in
Europe and the United States. It is striking
to note that overall the Fed is able to move
market rates twice as much as the ECB.
I also find that long-term US interest
rates react much more strongly to new
information from the Fed than the
equivalent reaction of European long-term
yields to new information in ECB
announcements. This discrepancy can be
explained in two ways. 
One possibility is that the Fed’s long-
term inflation objective is less explicit than
the ECB’s objective: the Fed’s mandate is
to pursue stability of both prices and
economic activity while the ECB’s mandate
assigns overriding importance to price
stability. Hence, long-term inflation
expectations (and hence interest rates) in
the United States may be more sensitive to
Fed statements than are those in the euro
area. In other words, Fed statements may
contain information not only about its
future policy intentions but also about its
opaque inflation target, which may vary
over time.
An alternative explanation might be
that Fed statements are more informative
than ECB statements, and as a result the
former move interest rates in the money
markets more than the latter.
My analysis suggests that the greater
sensitivity of US long-term yields to central
bank communication is intimately related
Figure 1:
The effects of central banks’ decisions and announcements
on interest rates, 1999-2006
Note: This figure plots the average total effect of the surprise components of central banks’
words and deeds on interest rates for the period 1999-2006. The horizontal axis is maturity of
interest rates – from three months to 10 years. The vertical axis is interest rates in basis points.
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The Fed’s words
have a much
greater effect on
market interest
rates than those
of the ECB
powerful than others. My research
suggests that the Fed’s words are treated
as a more accurate guide to future
monetary policy than those of the ECB –
and so a change in tone by the Fed is
more likely to move markets. What’s more,
the prevalence of dollar-denominated debt
means that Fed words even have the
capacity to move European interest rates. 
So why does the Fed move the market
more than the ECB? The Fed differs from
the ECB in at least two respects. The Fed
has not only been much more active than
the ECB, which could mean that the
market understands better what it says
and does – a transparency effect. But the
Fed also has a different institutional
mandate compared to the ECB – the Fed
is not ‘inflation targeting’.
Theoretical research has shown that
under the Fed's mandate, it is optimal to
communicate more information to the
public than under an inflation targeting
regime. But I find empirically that the
reason why the market responds more to
the Fed's announcements compared with
ECB statements is not due to its mandate;
rather, it is a pure transparency effect.
to the higher informational content of Fed
statements compared with those of the
ECB rather than to any difference in  
their institutional mandate. Figure 2 shows
that the Fed’s announcements predict its
future actions more precisely than the
corresponding announcements from 
the ECB.
Both the ECB and the Fed are
consistent (they match words with deeds)
but there remain some differences in their
communication policies. The ECB is fully
transparent in the very short run – what it
will do in the next month. For example,
when the keyword ‘strong vigilance’ is
used, the market understands that the
ECB will increase rates at its following
Governing Council meeting. The Fed is
more transparent in the short and medium
run – beyond the next meeting – and this
is clear in Figure 2.
There are also notable differences in
the word length of communications: the
Fed's balance-of-risk statement contains
about 220 words on average while the
ECB's statement contains 1,163 words 
(or 4,533 if the ‘Questions and Answers’
section is also considered). But
transparency is not a matter of the
number of words. Indeed, the ECB needs
to explain the content of its statement
during the Questions and Answers. For
example, at the press conference on 
5 June 2008, the ECB’s president 
Jean-Claude Trichet explained the meaning
of the expression ‘heightened alertness’
(http://www.ecb.int/press/
pressconf/2008/html/is080605.en.html).
If central bank words can move
domestic market interest rates, then it is
likely that these words may affect interest
rates in bonds denominated in other
currencies as well. I find that since 1999,
the Fed has been more able to move
European interest rates of all maturities
than the ECB to move US rates.
What drives this asymmetric
relationship? During the early years of the
euro, the ECB’s likely conduct of monetary
policy was not well known, and financial
market participants seemed to use
information from the Fed to forecast
future ECB behaviour on the assumption
that ECB monetary policy would be
influenced by Fed policy. Moreover, euro-
denominated money and bond markets
were much smaller than dollar-
denominated fixed income assets. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the causal effect
comes from the United States to Europe,
and not vice versa. 
But it is not clear whether the effect of
the Fed’s behaviour on European interest
rates is a simple consequence of global
financial integration, or whether financial
intermediaries think that the ECB really is
going to mimic the Fed’s behaviour. 
My results indicate that the ability of the
Fed to move euro- as well as dollar-
denominated debt seems to be tied to 
the predominance of dollar-denominated
fixed income assets rather than to an
attempt by the ECB to follow the Fed’s
monetary policy.
It is clear that central banks’ words are
powerful tools – but some are more
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This article summarises ‘Talking Less and
Moving the Market More: Is this the Recipe
for Monetary Policy Effectiveness? Evidence
from the ECB and the Fed’ by Carlo Rosa,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 855
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0855.pdf).
Carlo Rosa is a research associate at the
Center for Operations Research and
Econometrics (CORE), Université Catholique
de Louvain, and an associate in CEP’s
macroeconomics programme.
Figure 2:
Testing central bank transparency: the predictive 
ability of central bank actions using statements
Note: This figure plots the predictive ability of future policy rates using central bank statements
about its future intentions. The horizontal axis is maturity of interest rates – from three months
to two years. The vertical axis is the adjusted R2 of the regression.
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The end of trade unionism
as we know it? 
Trade unions have seen falling membership across most
advanced economies over the last 25 years. In Britain,
workers are far less likely to be members of a union than
they were two decades ago, and fewer and fewer
employers recognise unions for pay bargaining. While
unions remain important in the public sector, private
sector union membership has declined rapidly. Our
research tries to establish why this has happened and
whether it really matters for workers and for firms.
It is often assumed that the decline of large-scale
manufacturing plants has been the principal reason for
the decline in union membership. While this may be partly
true, employer recognition of unions does not depend
only on what industries produce. If workers continue to
want union representation, there is no reason why unions
should not be able to colonise new workplaces and new
occupations. While union recognition is usually up to the
employer, employers may be forced into recognition if
workers want it and possess sufficient bargaining power.
We analyse nationally representative data for British
private sector workplaces with 25 or more employees to
assess the differences in unionisation rates between
sectors and over time. We find that since 1980, there
have been substantial and persistent differences in
unionisation rates between sectors and regions.
‘Distribution, Hotels and Catering’ is the industry with the
lowest probability of unionisation, while this probability is
highest in ‘Energy and Water’. There are also sizeable
regional effects, with the probability of unionisation being
the lowest in the South East of England. And throughout
the period, larger workplaces have higher unionisation
rates than smaller ones.
But structural changes in the economy do not account for
much of the decline in unionisation. Only a third of the 28
percentage point decline in private sector union
recognition between 1980 and 2004 is attributable to
changes in workplace characteristics, such as the decline
of heavy industry. 
So most of the decline in union recognition – the
remaining two thirds – is not due to structural change.
Rather, it is due to the fact that after 1980, firms are
much less likely to recognise unions than firms that
employed the same number of people in the same region
and in the same industry in 1980. This is consistent with
studies suggesting that the decline in unionisation is
The number of workers belonging to trade unions has declined
markedly since the Conservative government’s reforms of the mid-
1980s. Alex Bryson and David Blanchflower explore the changing
nature of British unions and whether their decline really matters for
employees and firms.
in brief...
Unions are less prevalent in some
industries, such as catering, and
some regions, such as the South East
largely due to employers turning their back on unions –
preferring to ‘go’ or ‘remain’ non-union (see, for example,
Bryson et al, 2004). 
It is often assumed that union decline is accompanied by a
similar decline in the effect that remaining unions have on
workers and firms. Nationally, this must be the case: a
decline in the presence of unions means that they affect
fewer workplaces. But it is unclear what effect unions can
have on those workplaces that remain unionised. 
Unions’ effects depend on their ability to bargain on
behalf of their members and to act as the representative
voice of workers to management (as first noted by
Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Whether unions are able to
do so depends on which unions survived the decline in
unionisation – the strong ones, the weak ones or perhaps
a mixture of the two. Their effects also depend on firms’
preparedness and ability to resist union demands or
accommodate them.
Conventional wisdom among employers suggests that
unions are undesirable. But we find limited evidence that
unions have a negative effect on firms in recent years. 
In particular, there is little evidence that unions have a
negative impact on employment growth, financial
performance and industrial relations.
Although this may be because strong unions with the
power to disrupt business operations have disappeared,
there is no evidence for this. If anything, it seems that the
association between workplace closure and unionisation in
the 1990s was most evident where unions were weaker. 
Alternatively, it is possible that unions have increasingly
chosen to co-operate with employers. Our results suggest
that unionised workplaces have seen a faster
improvement in financial performance than non-unionised
workplaces, all else being equal. In part, this might be
because unions appear to have less impact on the wages
of their members than in the early 1980s. 
Overall, unions have a smaller effect today than they did
in 1980. But we are unable to establish whether this is
permanent or temporary. We would expect smaller union
effects when economic conditions are good, as employers
are often more profitable and in a better position to resist
union demands at such times.
Historically, unions have made their presence felt in
recessions, as unionised labour has proved more able to
hold onto the gains made in the boom years. Whether
unions will help protect their members from the current
economic slowdown remains to be seen. 
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This article summarises ‘Union Decline in Britain’ by David
Blanchflower and Alex Bryson, CEP Discussion Paper No. 864
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0864.pdf) and
forthcoming as a chapter in The Evolution of the Modern
Workplace edited by William Brown, Alex Bryson, John Forth
and Keith Whitfield, Cambridge University Press. The research
was conducted as part of an ESRC grant (RES-000-23-1603).
David Blanchflower is Bruce V. Rauner Professor of
Economics at Dartmouth College and a member of the Bank of
England’s Monetary Policy Committee. Alex Bryson is a
senior research fellow at the National Institute of Economic
and Social Research and a visiting research fellow at CEP.
Unions may help
protect their members
from the worst of 
the current economic
downturn
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